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We investigate how politics (party orientation, national elections, and strength of democratic 
institutions) affect stock market volatility. We hypothesize that labor-intensive industries, 
industries with larger exposure to foreign trade, industries whose operations require efficient 
contracts, and industries susceptible to government expropriation are more sensitive to 
changes in political environment. Using a large panel of industry-country-year observations, 
we show that politically-sensitive industries exhibit higher volatilities during national 
elections. Volatility is also higher for labor-intensive industries under leftist governments. 
Moreover, governance-sensitive industries and industries under a higher risk of expropriation 
are more volatile when democratic institutions are weak. The rise in volatility is driven 
largely by systematic risk rather than firm-specific risk. The results are consistent with the 
‘peso problem’ hypothesis that uncertainty about future government policies can increase 
stock market volatility. 
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Introduction  
Do politics affect the economy? According to the proponents of the ‘partisan theory’ 
(Hibbs, 1977), political structure influences economic outcomes because different 
parties enact governmental policies which cater to a specific electoral segment. On the 
other hand, according to the ‘rational partisan theory’ (Alesina, 1987), party 
orientation (left or right) should not have a material impact on economic outcomes 
because rational economic agents adjust their expectations depending on which party 
wins national elections.  
There is evidence that ruling party orientation affects inflation and employment 
(Alesina and Rodrik, 1994, Blomberg and Hess, 2001, Olters, 2001, Foerster and 
Schmitz, 1997, Fowler, 2006, Snowberg, et al., 2007) and the performance of stock 
markets (Santa-Clara and Valkanov, 2003, Füss and Bechtel, 2006). Moreover, 
volatility of stock prices increases during national elections in the OECD countries 
(Bialkowski, et al., 2006).  
In this paper, we examine the impact of politics on stock markets volatility. We 
ask the following general question: Does the political environment affect stock market 
volatility? By political environment we mean the ruling party’s orientation, the 
strength of a country’s democratic institutions, and whether national elections take 
place.  
Unlike existing studies that examine the relation between politics and stock 
market volatility for a single country (see, e.g., Füss and Bechtel, 2006) or a small 
group of developed counties (Bialkowski et al., 2006), our paper provides evidence 
based on a sample of 72 industries from 51 countries over 16 years. In order to 
understand how political environment affects volatility we use the approach 
introduced by Rajan and Zingales (1998) which is based on industry data from 
multiple countries. The Rajan and Zingales methodology can be outlined as follows. 
The Rajan and Zingales methodology can be outlined as follows: a framework applied 
to check whether a particular channel (in our case, the political channel) affects a 
certain economic outcome uses a test to determine if industries that are more sensitive 
to a channel exhibit different economic patterns (volatility in our case) in countries 
where that channel is likely to be at work. In other words, we test to see whether 
industries that are more sensitive to a particular political structure exhibit higher 
volatilities when that political structure (e.g. left government) is in place, effectively 
making predictions about within-country, across-industries differences in industry 
volatility based on interactions between country political structure and industry   - 2 -
characteristics. Our regressions include industry, country, and year fixed effects. The 
fixed effects methodology reduces the problems of omitted variables bias and model 
misspecification that typically afflict cross-country regressions. 
For our empirical analysis, we need to classify industries according to their 
sensitivity to politics, and we employ four sensitivities. First, more labor-intensive 
industries are likely to be more responsive to policies implemented by left 
governments. According to Botero et al. (2004) and Volpin and Pagano (2005), 
political power of the leftist governments is associated with stronger labor protection 
and weaker investor protection. Thus we expect more a pronounced effect of left 
governments on volatility of more labor-intensive industries.   
The second measure, foreign trade sensitivity, assesses industrial exposure to 
foreign trade. Politicians often exploit regulatory powers to impose costs of entry on 
international businesses to benefit incumbents. Rajan and Zingales (2003) describe 
how centralized governments constrain foreign trade to maintain the monopoly power 
of domestic market-oriented firms. We hypothesize that more internationally-
integrated industries are more sensitive to the political environment in countries with 
weaker democratic institutions.  
The third measure, governance sensitivity, aims to capture the need for effective 
governance in a particular industry. The measure is based on the concentration of 
input purchases from other industries. If an industry’s output requires inputs from 
only few other industries, it is less dependent on explicit contract enforcement by the 
regulatory authorities. On the other hand, if an industry uses a lot of inputs coming 
from different industries and is dependent on contracts, poor contracts enforcement 
may disrupt its transactions. Therefore, more autocratic governments or governments 
that tend to establish weak property rights are expected to be more detrimental to 
more governance-sensitive industries.  
The last sensitivity measure captures the risk of expropriation. We proxy for this 
risk by disentangling industry profitability into two parts: a part driven by luck (by a 
variable beyond managerial control, such as the level of oil prices) and a part 
determined by managerial skill and effort (not driven by oil prices). We conjecture 
that it is easier for governments to expropriate from a company whose profits are 
related more to exogenous economic conditions, such as high oil prices, rather than 
managers’ expertise or effort. We expect that expropriation-prone industries are more 
volatile when governments do not respect property rights.   - 3 -
The four sensitivities (labor, foreign trade, governance, and expropriation risk) are 
interacted with country-level political variables. These variables are: elections, chief 
executive’s party orientation (left, tight, or center), level of democracy, and the degree 
of protection of property rights.  
We provide robust evidence that politics affect volatility. Specifically, more labor-
intensive industries, foreign trade-sensitive, governance-sensitive, and expropriation-
vulnerable industries experience higher stock price volatility during the times of 
national elections. As expected, government party orientation has a strong influence 
on labor-intensive industries; their volatility is significantly larger when left 
governments are in power.
1 Governance-sensitive industries or expropriation-prone 
industries are more volatile when governments are autocratic or operate in countries 
with weak property rights.  Our results are economically significant. For example, the 
hotels industry (a labor-intensive industry) is 6% more volatile than the foods industry 
(a low labor-intensity industry) in countries with left governments in comparison to 
the same industries in countries with right governments. Similarly, in a country with 
insecure property rights, such as Venezuela, the oil and gas extraction industry (high-
expropriation risk industry) is 8.8% more volatile than the agriculture industry (a low-
expropriation risk industry) compared to similar industries in Norway, a country with 
developed property rights.  
How can political structure and political events affect volatility? We argue that it 
can be driven by the ‘peso problem.’ The peso problem shows that volatility is 
influenced by markets’ anticipation of a rare, potentially catastrophic event that may 
or may not materialize. Political events fit well with this potential explanation since 
investors generate different possible scenarios with varying probabilities.  First, 
election outcomes are uncertain and may or may not result in a dramatic change in the 
political environment. Second, the strength of democratic institutions is closely 
related to the probability of a potentially catastrophic event for the firm, such as 
expropriation or nationalization. Finally, government orientation is related to the 
possibilities of interventions. Thus, political events, though not in themselves 
disastrous, may affect the probabilities of potentially harmful events. 
                                                 
1 One might expect the opposite to be the case, with lower uncertainty for labor-intensive firms under 
left governments. However, the likelihood of labor-related policy change is higher when left 
governments are in power. Anticipation of such a change, whether positive or negative, should result in 
higher volatility. 
   - 4 -
 This view has been recently advanced in a number of papers which are related to 
our work.  A study by the economic historian Voth (2002) demonstrates that the 
unusually high volatility during the Great Depression in a number of advanced 
economies can be explained by the perceived threat of a communist takeover (proxied 
by the number of disruptive events, such as assassinations, general strikes, riots, anti-
government demonstrations, etc.). Bittlingmayer (1998) makes a claim that the 
increase in volatility in Weimar Germany caused a subsequent decrease in output. He 
attributes the increase in volatility to uncertainty about political events triggered by 
the fear of socialists taking power. We, on the other hand, show that even the 
expectations of less dramatic events, such as pro-labor legislation or expropriations of 
individual businesses, can explain differential levels of volatility across countries and 
industries.  
Next, we turn our attention to different components of volatility – idiosyncratic 
(firm-specific) and systematic volatility. The components of the total variation of 
stock returns have received a lot of attention in recent research. Campbell et al. (2001) 
document the increasing time trend in idiosyncratic volatility observed in the US 
stock market over the last four decades (1962 - 1996). Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) 
find evidence that the R
2 of the market model – the ratio of firm-specific returns 
variation to total variation – is higher in countries with underdeveloped institutions.  
We repeat the analysis by using the market model R
2 measure.  We find R
2 is not 
different for politically-sensitive industries during national elections and does not 
depend on party orientation. This is because the increase in total volatility in response 
to political events is evenly spread out between the firm-specific and systematic 
components of the volatility. However politically-sensitive industries have higher R
2s 
in more autocratic countries or countries with weaker property rights; the increase in 
total volatility for politically-sensitive industries is driven by an increase in systematic 
return variation and/or a simultaneous decrease in firm-specific variation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 develops the hypothesis. 
Section 2 describes the sample and variables. Section 3 reports the results on 
volatility. Section 4 presents volatility decomposition results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
1. Hypothesis  
According to a standard stock price model, stock price is equal to the expected 
discounted present value of its dividends. Assuming a constant discount rate, the price 
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In (1), P is the price of a stock in period t conditional on information set￿ Ω, d are 
dividends, and r is a constant discount rate. Volatility of stock price can then be 
defined as the average size of innovations in the present discounted value of dividends 
(West, 1988): 
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Volatility also gave rise to one of the most widely recognized asset pricing 
anomalies – the excess volatility puzzle. Evidence that the volatility of stock prices is 
too high to be justified by the subsequent volatility of fundamentals was first 
documented in early 1980s (Shiller, 1981, LeRoy and Porter, 1981, among others). In 
this paper, we do not aim to resolving the volatility puzzle per se, but rather we seek 
to make an intuitive argument that more politically-sensitive industries experience 
higher levels of volatility when a particular political structure is in place or these 
industries face substantial political risk.
2  
The following simple example illustrates this point. Consider two firms, one 
operating in a politically-sensitive industry and another operating in an industry not 
subject to political risks. The two firms are identical in terms of future cash flows. 
However, in period t, a politically-sensitive company is forced into bankruptcy due to 
a political event that happens with probability θi,t.
3 The second firm operates 
indefinitely. Given the probability of a bankruptcy, the formula for the stock price of a 
politically-sensitive firm becomes,   
 
                                                 
2 As Shiller (1981, p. 434) notes, “Another way to save the general notion of efficient markets is to say 
that our measure of uncertainty regarding future dividends…understates the true uncertainty about 
future dividends. Perhaps the market was rightfully fearful of much larger movements than actually 
materialized.” 
3 For instance, in natural resource industries, especially during periods of high commodity prices, 
corporate profits and rents are relatively easy to capture, placing firms in these industries under a 
greater risk of expropriation by the government or other potential predators, such as rival companies ( 
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In (3), ∏ = + −
j
k k t i 1 , ) 1 ( θ  is the probability that a company survives up to period t + 
k. From (3), the volatility of a politically-sensitive firm comes from two sources:  (i) 
variation of innovations in the present discounted value of dividends, and (ii) 
variation of innovations in liquidation probabilities. Paribus ceteris, the variation in 
the share price of a politically-sensitive firm is expected to be larger than the variation 
of the share price of a politically-insensitive firm, as an additional source of potential 
variance is introduced. Equation (3) shows that stock price volatility might be higher 
during election years, as it is reasonable to expect larger variation in liquidation 
probabilities during those periods.  
As for higher volatilities of politics-sensitive industries during leftist, autocratic, 
or predatory governments, we rely on the argument in Veronesi (2004)
4. The author 
argues that in an environment of higher uncertainty, investors are more responsive to 
news, which may contribute to excess volatility. In a theoretical model where there is 
a small ex ante chance that the drift rate of dividends shifts to a low state (zero, in our 
case), the author shows that negative shocks to fundamentals result in higher return 
volatility. 
Therefore the hypothesis we test in this paper is formulated as follows: More 
politically-sensitive industries have larger volatility levels during the periods of 
changing expectations of political events.  
 
2. Empirical Specification and Variables 
A. Empirical Specification 
Our regressions are similar to those in Rajan and Zingales (1998) and include 
interaction effects of industrial sensitivities with country variables, as well as fixed 
effects to account for unobserved industry-, country-, and year-specific 
characteristics. The main advantage of this methodology is that by controlling for all 
                                                 
4 Veronesi (2004) investigates the implications of the “peso problem” hypothesis on a number of asset 
pricing anomalies, such as high risk premia, asymmetric volatility reaction to good and bad news, 
excess sensitivity of price reactions to dividend changes and excess volatility.    - 7 -
the fixed effects, the problem of omitted variables bias or model specification, which 
can afflict cross-country regressions, is mitigated.  
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were ind indexes industries, c indexes country, and t indexes time. All regression 
specifications include industry fixed effects ( ind α ), country fixed effects ( c δ ), and 
year fixed effects (ηt). Industries are defined at the 2-digit SIC code. The dependent 
variable,  c
t ind LVOL , , is the log of industry volatility defined below. The independent 
variables include interaction terms of sensitivities measures (SENSITIVITY) with 
political variables (POLITICAL). After controlling for fixed effects, the main 
coefficient of interest ( 1 β ) measures the incremental increase in volatility given a unit 
increase in sensitivity conditional on country political structure.  
Our sample consists of all firms covered by the Worldscope and Datastream. 
These databases cover major publicly-listed companies from 51 countries. The sample 
starts in 1990 and ends in 2005. The sample covers over 27,779 firms from 51 
countries. 
 
B. Volatility Measure  
The dependent variable in (4) is industry volatility. First, we calculate volatility 











t w firm c
t firm
c













w firm r ,  is weekly return, 
c
t firm W ,  is the number of weekly observations in year t = 
1996-2005, and 
c
t firm r ,  is the average return during year t.
5 The returns are expressed in 
local currencies. We drop firm with fewer than 30 trading weeks. Firm volatilities are 
then aggregated to 2-digit SIC industries by averaging across all firms and countries,   
                                                 
5 Weekly rather than daily returns are used because Datastream reports a zero return when a stock is 
not traded on particular days. Therefore, weekly returns are less subject to a potential noise due to 
infrequent trading. For a future robustness check we plan to use daily returns because daily returns are 






















t I is the number of firms in an industry.
 6  We drop industries with fewer than 
5 firm observations. Finally, VOL is expressed in logs (we call it LVOL to 
differentiate from simple volatility) to improve the normality of the variable.
7  
 
C. Industry Sensitivities to Political Environment 
The sensitivity measures are computed using a sample of U.S. publicly listed firms 
from COMPUSTAT tapes. Subsequently, the U.S. is dropped from the sample. Rajan 
and Zingales (1998) argue that as the US markets are virtually frictionless, ‘true’ 
sensitivity of an industry to a respective factor is observed in those markets. Therefore 
these variables can be viewed as “desired” (under optimal market conditions) levels. 
Each industry in every country is then assigned the corresponding value based on U.S. 
data.  
 
C.1 Labor sensitivity 
Labor intensity of an industry is used to measure labor sensitivity. We hypothesize 
that the industries that use rely heavily on labor force are more sensitive to political 
environment, e.g., party orientation.  
Labor intensity is computed by dividing the value of labor inputs over the total 
value of inputs. Data on inputs is obtained from the input-output database developed 
by Dale W. Jorgenson and described in Jorgenson (1990) and Jorgenson and Stiroh 
(2000). The dataset contains values of labor, capital, energy and material inputs. The 
authors assembled a detailed dataset on labor price, quantity, quality and value, as 
well as some additional indicators using industry data from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis and Bureau of Labor Statistics. The data set covers 35 sectors at the 2-digit 
                                                 
6 We plan to recalculate the returns variation using industry value-weighted index. 
7 The original volatility is highly positively skewed (skewedness = 4.13). The log of volatility, 
however, has skewedness close to zero (-0.05). The skewedness-kurtosis combined test cannot reject 
the hypothesis that the log of volatility is normally distributed (Chi-squared statistics = 4.19 with  p-
value = 0.22). See D’Agostino, Balanger, and D’Agostino Jr. (1990) for details of this test.   - 9 -
SIC level from 1959 to 1996.
8 We use time-variant measures from 1990 through 
1995; for years 1996-2005, we rely on time-invariant values for 1995.
9 
Figure 1 and column three of Table I present labor sensitivities grouped by 2-digit 
SIC. The average labor sensitivity is 0.307, the least labor intensive industry is 
petroleum refining (relying on highly automated heavy machinery) - 0.084, whereas 
among the most labor intensive industries are hotels (a service industry with highly 
customized attention requirements) - 0.445, building construction (relying on non-
automated human-operated heavy machinery) - 0.43, and measuring instruments 
(requiring human precision) - 0.494. 
 
C.2 Foreign trade sensitivity  
Foreign trade sensitivity assesses the exposure of a particular industry to foreign 
trade. Economic policies related to openness (e.g., liberalization) should have greater 
impact on economically integrated industries compared to industries operating only in 
domestic markets. On the other hand, governments may favor closed markets to 
protect incumbent companies from outside competition.  
Foreign trade sensitivity is defined as (value of exports + value of imports) / value 
of output. The trade data are obtained from the United States International Trade 
Commission and contain statistics on the value of exports and imports. Imports are 
represented by the customs value of imports for consumption, and exports are 
measured by the FAS (free alongside ship) value. Data are available for 
manufacturing industries only. Output is measured by the value of shipments 
available for 2002 at the 3-digit NAICS level at the Bureau of Census. Three-digit 
NAICS codes have been translated into 2-digit SICs.
10 Trade sensitivities appear on 
Figure 2 and in column four of Table I. The average trade sensitivity is 0.513. 
Automotive repair, being a highly localized service industry, exhibits the lowest share 
of trade in industry output (0.014), whereas highly mobile and versatile 
manufacturing industries, like apparel (0.91) and leather products (0.968), have the 




                                                 
8 The dataset is available at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/jorgenson/data.html. 
9 A similar variable is used by Mueller and Phillippon (2007) in a study of labor relations and 
ownership structure. 
10 The relationship between NAICS and SICs is one-to-many, rather than one-to-one.    - 10 -
C.3. Governance sensitivity 
Industries whose operations depend on contracts enforceability are more vulnerable to 
governments’ policies. We measure the need for reliable contracts by governance 
sensitivity, defined as the concentration of purchases of a certain industry. If in its 
production, an industry uses input from only few other industries, it is less dependent 
on explicit governance by regulatory authorities. On the other hand, if an industry 
uses inputs coming from different industries and therefore is dependent on contracts’ 
enforceability, poor governance may disrupt its transactions. The measure has been 
developed by Blanchard and Kremer (1997), and applied by Rajan and Subramanian 
(2007) and Levchenko (2007). Governance sensitivity is one minus the Herfindahl 
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where  j i, φ  is the share of input of industry j in the production of industry i. 
Governance sensitivity is zero if the industry uses only one input from other 
industries, and it approaches one, as the number of inputs coming from other 
industries increases and their shares become smaller. The data used to compute 
governance sensitivities is compiled in the US IO (input-output) tables by the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis. The data are assembled at the 2-digit SIC level, and is 
collected for the year 2005.
11 Governance sensitivities are depicted in Figure 3 and 
reported in column five of Table I. The average governance sensitivity score is 0.847. 
The concentration in reliance on inputs from other industries is especially high for 
manufacturing industries like forestry and petroleum refining (they use very few 
inputs), resulting in the lowest governance sensitivity scores. On the other hand, most 
of the services industries exhibit the highest scores, reflecting their reliance on 
numerous inputs from diverse industries. Other scores appear less intuitive, for 
example metal mining has higher complexity than electronic and electrical 
equipment.
12  
                                                 
11 The earlier data are not usable because the input-output matrix is organized by Industrial 
Organization codes which do not correspond to SIC codes. 
12 Blanchard and Kremer (1997) compute the same variable using input-output matrix data as of 1991-
1994 for several former Soviet republics. Our industry sensitivities are consistent with theirs: refineries 
(petroleum refining in our study) have the second lowest score, whereas glass and porcelain (stone, 
clay and glass in our study) has among the highest complexity scores. Levchenko (2007) uses the US   - 11 -
 
C.4. Expropriation risk sensitivity  
If governments do not respect property rights that should have an effect on 
industries that are more prone to expropriation. We measure the expropriation risk 
sensitivity as industry sensitivity of profits with respect to oil prices as in Durnev and 
Guriev (2007).
13 The underlying premise is that the risk of government expropriation 
is higher for industries whose profits are driven more by luck, rather than managerial 
effort. ‘Luck’ is measured by industries’ sensitivities to the level of oil prices – 
something beyond managerial control.
14 Following Bruno and Claessens (2007), oil 
price sensitivity is defined as the coefficient 
ind β on the natural logarithm of oil price 
in a regression of industry inflation-adjusted valuation on time trend and log of real 
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where Q is the median industry valuation (inflation-adjusted), α  is a constant, t is the 
time trend, P
oil is inflation-adjusted price of oil, and μ  is the error term. Regression 
(8) is estimated for every 2-digit SIC industry using a sample of U.S. publicly listed 
firms from COMPUSTAT tapes from 1950 through 2005. Industry valuation is 
defined as the sum of firm market value (COMPUSTAT item #199 times #25), total 
assets (#6) minus firm book value of equity (#60) over firm total assets.
 15 Figure 5 
plots industry oil price-dependency for 72 U.S. industries aggregated at the two-digit 
SIC level. According to Figure 4 and the sixth column of Table I, the majority of 
industries (56 out of 72) show negative oil price sensitivities. Industries that rely on 
                                                                                                                                            
IO tables, like we do, but computes the variable at the 4 digit SIC level, regardless he also finds that 
petroleum refining has one of the lowest complexity scores. 
13 Durnev and Guriev (2007) argue that predatory governments are more likely to expropriate corporate 
profits in natural-resource industries when prices of such resources are higher. 
14 Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) use a similar argument to differentiate between managerial luck 
and skill in a study of CEOs compensation. Other papers use an increase in oil price as an exogenous 
shock to industry profitability. For example, Lamont (1987) studies the relation between investment 
and cash flow by employing the 1982 oil shock. He observes that, on average, non-oil divisions of oil 
firms experienced a larger drop in investment than non-oil firms. Chhaochharia and Laeven (2007) use 
the relation between industry profits and oil price to address endogeneity between corporate 
governance and performance. 
15 To check for robustness, we substitute the oil dependency variable with the oil and gas extraction 
industry dummy variable which takes a value of one for industries that belong to oil and gas extraction 
sector (SIC code = 13) and zero otherwise. This industry includes companies primarily engaged in: (1) 
producing crude petroleum and natural gas; (2) extracting oil from oil sands and oil shale; (3) 
producing natural gasoline an cycle condensate; and (4) producing gas and hydrocarbon liquids from 
coal at the mine site. The results remain qualitatively unchanged when we use this new variable.   - 12 -
oil and other natural resources as a major production input exhibit negative 
sensitivities (especially “Petroleum Refining” and “Transportation Services”). As 
expected, industries whose major outputs are natural resources have positive 
sensitivities (“Mining of Minerals”, “Coal Mining”, “Oil and Gas Extraction”).  
Using historical data on expropriations around the world (1955-2003) we confirm 
that oil price-dependent industries have experienced more instances of expropriation. 
Figure 5 utilizes Kolotilin’s (2007) data (which, in turn, is based on the dataset of 
nationalizations in Kobrin, 1980, 1984) and depicts the relation between the total 
number of expropriations of foreign companies (grouped by major industries) and oil 
price-dependency.
16 Expropriation is defined as a forced divestment of foreign 
property, and includes formal expropriation, extra-legal forced transfer of ownership, 
forced sale, and revision of contractual agreements using the coercive power of the 
government. The largest number of expropriations has been in the petroleum industry 
(98) followed by manufacturing (98), and mining (55). The number of expropriation 
instances in services, construction, and media are the lowest: 12, 8, and 3, 
respectively.  Furthermore, it is evident that more oil price-dependent industries had 
more expropriations during 1955-2005.
17 
 
D. Political Structure Variables 
We rely on the World Bank’s database on political institutions compiled by Beck et 
al. (2001) to define main party orientation and election years. The data are cross-
checked using a number of sources: Journal of Democracy, Elections around the 
World,  Election Guide, and CIA Factbook
18. The party orientation (left, right, or 
center) dummy variable takes a value of one if the chief executive’s party orientation 
is left and zero otherwise. Similarly, the election year dummy takes a value of one 
during the year of executive election. The executive election year is the year of 
parliamentary election for a parliamentary system or assembly elected presidential 
system, and the year of presidential election for a presidential system. Table II 
contains country-level information on the political system (presidential or 
parliamentary), chief executive’s party type (left, right, or center), and government 
executive election dates. The sixteen years (1990 - 2005) in our sample allow us to 
                                                 
16 We thank Sergei Guriev for providing us with these data. 
17 The upward trend does not change if we scale the number of expropriations by industry aggregate 
market value calculated using all firms from Worldscope during time period 1990-2005  The scaling 
factor is not perfect though as it includes only publicly-traded corporations. 
18 The data is available at http://www.electionworld.org and http://www.electionguide.org and 
http://www.cia.gov respectively.   - 13 -
capture at least two and sometimes three entire government cycles of standard four-
year length. Thirty-six countries have a parliamentary system and, on average, have 
had 4.14 executive elections over our sample period. Under the presidential system 
(12 countries), the terms of office are longer and the average number of elections is 
3.16. 
In order to measure political constraints on chief executives, we use democracy 
and autocracy indexes compiled by a well-known political data set, POLITY IV 
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2006). The autocracy index is calculated as POLITY’s 
“autocratic government” variable minus POLITY’s “democratic government” 
variable.
19 The “autocratic government” variable measures general closedness of 
political institutions, whereas the “democratic government” measures general 
openness. The two variables assess a number of factors, such as (i) competitiveness of 
political participation; (ii) regulation of participation; (iii) the openness and 
competitiveness of executive recruitment; and (iv) constraints on the chief 
executive.
20  
Next, we discuss the construction of the predation index which aims at capturing 
country-level degree of predation. The predation index consists of the following 
attributes: (i) corruption in government; (ii) risk of government expropriation; (iii) 
lack of property rights protection; (iv) rule of law (assessment of law and order 
tradition in a country); (v) government stance towards business (assessment of the 
likelihood that the current government will implement business-unfriendly policies); 
(vi) freedom to compete (assessment of government policies towards establishing a 
competitive market environment); (vii) quality of bureaucracy (assessment of whether 
bureaucracy impedes fair business practices); and (viii) impact of crime (assessment 
of whether crime impedes private businesses development). The corruption and the 
rule of law indexes are obtained from Transparency International, while the rest of 
the indexes come from the Economist Intelligence Unit.  
Individual indexes of institutional development are known to be highly correlated 
and using them in one regression could be subject to multicollinearity. To address this 
problem, we use the first principal component analysis (PCA) technique to combine 
the eight indexes described above into a unified index. The PCA is a statistical 
                                                 
19 We add a constant to the score to change the scaling from -10-to-10 to 0-to-20. Furthermore, this 
variable is available for the time period from 1990 through 2003. It is available for all countries, except 
for Hong Kong. 
20 The data are available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity.   - 14 -
method to reduce multidimensional data sets to lower dimensions.
21 The first principal 
component captures 64% of the corresponding cross-sectional variance of the eight 
variables above. Moreover, only the first eigenvalue is significantly larger than one; 
thus one factor is sufficient to capture much of the common variation among the eight 
variables. The loadings for the predation index (based on the PCA) are: 0.103 for the 
corruption index; 0.160 for the risk of government expropriation; 0.202 for lack of 
property rights protection index; 0.206 for the rule of law index; 0.116 for the 
government stance towards business index; 0.118 for the freedom to compete index; 
0.200 for the quality of bureaucracy index; and 0.093 for the impact of crime index. 
All loadings are positive meaning that the eight proxies of institutional development 
are positively correlated.
22   
 
3. Empirical Results  
A. Univariate Analysis 
Statistics by country (GDP per capita, volatility, predation and autocracy) are 
reported in Table III. The last column lists the number of firm-years observations per 
country used in calculating the volatility. 
Table IV reports correlation coefficients between the main variables: logs of 
volatility, political sensitivity measures (labor, foreign trade, governance, and 
expropriation), and country variables (GDP per capita, autocracy, and predation). 
More foreign trade-intensive, labor-intensive, as well as oil price-dependent industries 
have significantly larger levels of stock return volatility. More governance-intensive 
industries (as measured by complexity of inputs) are less volatile. Industries in more 
economically developed, less predatory, and less autocratic countries exhibit lower 
volatilities. This is evident from the positive and significant correlation between 
predation, autocracy, and volatility, while correlation between GDP per capita and 
volatility is negative and significant.  
In Table V, we compare volatility measures depending on: the type of main 
government party orientation (Panel A), whether it is an election year or not (Panel 
                                                 
21 In brief, PCA can be viewed as an orthogonal linear transformation that alters the data to a new 
coordinate system such that the greatest variance by any projection of the data comes to lie on the first 
coordinate (called the first principal component), the second greatest variance on the second 
coordinate, and so on. See Stevens (1986) for details.  
22 Thus, Predation Index = 0.103 × corruption + 0.160 × risk of government expropriation + 0.202 × 
property rights protection + 0.206 × rule of law index + 0.116 × government stance towards business + 
0.118 × freedom to compete + 0.200 × quality of bureaucracy + 0.093 × impact of crime. In the above 
formula, each of eight indexes is normalized, that is, they have zero mean and variance equal to 1. We 
multiply this index by -1 and add a constant equal to the maximum value of the index so that larger 
values of the index represent more predation.   - 15 -
B), high (75
th percentile) versus low (25
th percentile) Autocracy index (Panel C), and 
high (75
th percentile) versus low (25
th percentile) Predation index (Panel D). Stock 
market volatility is higher when a left party is in power. Although the difference is 
small (0.02%), it is significant according to the t-test of means comparison. Panel B 
reveals that market volatility are not different during election years when averaged 
over the whole sample. Election years, however, do have an impact on volatility when 
considered together with our industry sensitivities in the next section. Panels C and D 
report very strong differences in volatility depending on the degree of autocracy and 
predation. Admittedly, the high quartiles of these two measures may be capturing the 
low income countries.  
We also execute differences in means tests for each country in the sample.
23 For 
16 (14) countries out of 28, the level of volatility is (significantly) higher when the 
party orientation is left. Nine of these countries are from Continental Europe. 
However, seven developed and four emerging markets show higher volatility under 
right governments. These results do not allow us to make an unequivocal conclusion 
that left governments introduce more political uncertainty in all countries, rather we 
see a more complex picture that leads us to disentangle the political sources of stock 
return volatility using industry sensitivities.  
 
B. Regression Results 
In this section, we test our main prediction that more politically-sensitive industries 
exhibit higher levels of volatility during periods of political uncertainty and periods of 
low property rights protection as measured by political party orientation, elections, 
predatory policies, and autocracy. In each regression, we control for unobservable 
year, industry, and country characteristics by including fixed effects. The reported p-
values (in parentheses) are calculated using heteroscedasticity-adjusted robust 
standard errors. The results are presented in Table VI. Every panel of the table 
contains four specifications, one for every sensitivity measure.  
Panel A of Table VI presents the estimates of regression (4) with interaction terms 
between industry sensitivities and election year dummy. This specification provides 
the strongest justification of our hypotheses. Every sensitivity measure (interacted 
with election year) is positive and significant at the 10% level. Thus more labor-
intensive industries, industries with a greater share of exports and imports, more 
governance-intensive industries, as well as more expropriation-prone industries, 
                                                 
23 We do not report the results to save space.   - 16 -
exhibit higher volatilities during elections years. Since we control for industry and 
country fixed effects, these volatilities can be interpreted as volatilities relative to 
those of all other industries. Therefore, we find evidence that the political uncertainty 
introduced by elections results in higher volatility in industries that are more sensitive 
to all four channels of potential political influence in our study. However, election 
years themselves do not have an impact on stock markets volatility; the coefficients 
on the elections dummies are insignificant across all specifications. Thus, presumably 
non-politically sensitive industries actually become less volatile, resulting in 
unchanged volatility for the whole sample. 
Next, we turn our attention to the impact of ruling party orientation on volatility. 
The results of the regressions appear in Panel B of Table VI. The primary variable of 
interest is labor intensity. We expect that more labor-intensive industries are more 
sensitive to political uncertainty when the party in power is left. The result confirms 
our expectations – the interaction term’s coefficient between left party and labor 
intensity is positive and significant. This is consistent with our assertion that left 
parties will push for pro-labor policies, whereas it is not so obvious that left parties 
will necessarily disrespect contracts. On the contrary, it is possible, that left 
governments may tend to introduce rigidities in terms of bureaucracy and regulation 
that favor industries that rely on many contractual relationships (negative and 
significant coefficient on the governance interaction term). The other two interactions 
of sensitivities are not significant (foreign trade and expropriation). The left party 
dummy variable is positive and significant for three out of four specifications 
indicating that volatility of labor-intensive industries is higher when the party 
orientation is left. 
The results of the effect of industry sensitivities coupled with the degree of 
government predation on volatility are reported in Panel D of Table VI. The predation 
index is positive and highly significant in all specifications: higher degree of 
government predation leads to greater volatility for the whole sample. Additionally, 
these increases are even more pronounced for firms in industries more dependant on a 
variety of inputs and therefore contract enforcement, or industries, whose input is 
more dependent on luck (oil prices). However, total volatility appears to decrease for 
more labor intensive industries in countries with predatory governments. We find the 
same result for autocratic regimes in Panel C. Presumably predatory governments and 
autocratic regimes apply consistent treatment with respect to firms from labor 
intensive industries, leading to decreased stock returns volatility.    - 17 -
In Panel C of Table VI, we report significant positive coefficients of the 
interaction terms in the governance and expropriation equations indicating that 
autocracy regimes have similarly positive effect on volatility as does the degree of 
government predation. The autocracy variable is only significant in the labor 
equation. 
In summary, Table VI documents that politically-sensitive industries become 
more volatile during election years and volatility increases under a left ruling party or 
more predatory governments.  
The differential impact of political variables on volatility is economically 
significant. To demonstrate, we compare a high-labor intensity industry (hotels, labor 
sensitivity = 0.445) with a low-labor intensity industry (foods products, labor 
sensitivity = 0.171). According to Table VI (Panels A-B), the coefficient on the 
interaction term of labor sensitivity with elections dummy is 0.164; the coefficient on 
the interaction of labor sensitivity with left government dummy is 0.233. These 
numbers mean that volatility is 4.5% higher for the hotels industry than for the foods 
production industry during the elections years; hotels industry’s volatility is 6.6% 
higher than foods industry’s volatility under left-wing governments.
24 
Similar calculations are performed to estimate the impact of predation on 
differential volatility between industries with high- and low- expropriation risk, 
conditional on their country of location. The coefficient on the interaction term of 
expropriation sensitivity with predation (Panel D of Table VI) is 0.200. Consider an 
expropriation-sensitive industry (oil and gas extraction, expropriation sensitivity = 
0.049) and an industry with a low risk of expropriation (agriculture crops, 
expropriation sensitivity = -0.110). When these industries are located in a country like 
Norway (predation index = 0.51), the Oil industry is only 1.6% more volatile than the 
Agriculture industry. However, volatility of the oil industry is much larger (by 10.4%) 
relative to the agriculture industry in a country with high expropriation risk, such as 
Venezuela (predation index = 3.1). The differential volatility between the two 
countries is thus 8.8% (10.4% – 1.6%).
25 
                                                 
24 It is calculated as VOLhotel / VOLfood  = exp{0.164 × [0.445 – 0.171]} = 1.046  for elections results 
and VOLhotel / VOLfood  = exp{0.233 × [0.445 – 0.171]} = 1.066 for party-orientation results.  VOLhotel 
(food) denotes volatility for the hotels industry and food products industry, respectively. 
25 It is calculated as VOLoil / VOLagriculture￿ = exp{0.200 × [0.049 – (-0.110)] × 0.51} = 1.016 for 
Norway and VOLoil / VOLagriculture￿ = exp{0.200 × [0.049 – (-0.110)] × 3.1}= 1.104 for Venezuela. 
VOLoil (agriculture) denotes volatility for the oil and gas extraction industry and the agriculture crops 
industry, respectively.   - 18 -
 
C. Discussion 
Our simple theoretical model suggests that the political environment should have 
an influence on stock market volatility. Yet, existing evidence on such influence is, at 
best, mixed. Some problems that researchers are facing are illustrated by some of our 
results. When we compare total volatility under right and left governments, we 
document significantly higher volatilities under left parties. The difference is, 
however, quite small, and, more importantly, eleven countries in our sample display 
the opposite volatility patterns. This highlights a potential for sample selection bias, 
along with unobserved heterogeneity attributed to country, time, and industry effects. 
Any, potentially unseen, changes to these factors might reverse the results. 
Intuitively, one may expect that some firms are more sensitive to changes in 
political environment than others. There is considerable variation in firms’ 
sensitivities to corporate governance standards, labor and other legislation, potential 
government intervention and so on. Therefore, different firms will react to changes in 
political environment differently. It is not immediately apparent which firms or 
industries are more vulnerable to changes in political structures. We approximate 
political sensitivity by four distinct measures: (1) labor sensitivity, (2) foreign trade 
sensitivity, (3) corporate governance sensitivity, and (4) expropriation risk sensitivity. 
In short, we contend that a firm sensitive to one of the above measures will be more 
sensitive to political uncertainty. 
Our results are largely consistent with this hypothesis. National elections increase 
volatilities in all politically-sensitive firms. This is hardly surprising, as there is a 
potential that current government policies will change, which will be reflected by the 
changes in probabilities of a rare, potentially harmful event, such as government 
intervention.  
Left governments have traditionally been associated with ‘pro-labor’ policies. It 
is, therefore, intuitive to expect labor-sensitive firms to exhibit higher levels of 
volatility during the rule of such governments, as they are more likely to engage in 
labor-protective policies that are disruptive to the firm. Our results are in line with 
such an expectation with labor intensive industries exhibiting higher volatilities under 
left governments. 
Firms’ reliance on explicit corporate governance is not constant across industries. 
Some firms use a lot of inputs from different industries, and are, therefore, relying 
heavily on contract enforcement and explicit governance by regulatory authorities.   - 19 -
Such firms might experience additional uncertainty when autocratic governments are 
in power; as such governments are normally associated with poor corporate 
governance standards. We indeed document higher volatilities in governance-
sensitive industries during the rule of more autocratic governments, which is 
consistent with the above proposition. We also document higher systematic 
volatilities under autocratic governments, which may imply that stock prices become 
less informative in those years. 
Finally, changes in political environment could lead to a potentially catastrophic 
event, such as expropriation. We measure industries’ expropriation risk by how 
dependent are their profits on luck, rather than managerial effort. In case of the 
former, high profits are unlikely to fade once the government takeover has taken 
place, whereas in case of the later there is a strong chance of profits disappearing. We 
assume that those industries whose profits are largely driven by levels of commodity 
prices (oil) are more prone to expropriation and, therefore, will experience greater 
uncertainty when predatory governments are in power. Our results are consistent with 
such an expectation.  
On the other hand, our expectation that firms that are more exposed to foreign 
trade will experience higher volatility during autocratic governments was not 
supported by the data. However, such firms have been found to have higher 
systematic volatilities under autocratic governments. Overall, our results demonstrate 
a strong link between political sensitivities and volatility. 
 
4. Volatility Decomposition  
Although we document that political structure has a strong impact of industry 
volatility it is not clear which part of volatility (idiosyncratic or systematic) drives our 
results. It is interesting to analyze how political uncertainty is reflected in the 
volatility components so as to produce the increase in total volatility documented in 
the previous section. Furthermore, the insignificance of the autocracy variable in 
Panel C of Table VI invites the conjecture that this particular type of political 
uncertainty affects the two components of volatility in opposing directions thereby 
leaving the total volatility unchanged. 
The components of the total variation of stock returns, one of which is 
idiosyncratic volatility, have been shown to exhibit a number of regularities in recent 
research. Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) find evidence that return correlations are 
caused by low institutional quality, rather than by company fundamentals and   - 20 -
conjecture that this effect has informational efficiency implications. Jin and Myers 
(2006) shed light on the link between poor institutions and R
2 by establishing that the 
opacity of a firm is related to low idiosyncratic volatility and therefore high 
correlation with market factors. Campbell et al. (2001) provide the first dramatic 
account for the increasing time trend in idiosyncratic volatility observed in the US 
stock market over the last four decades (1962 - 1996). They speculate that the rise in 
idiosyncratic volatility may be explained by several recent trends: the breaking up of 
conglomerates; issuance of stock earlier in the firm’s life cycle; the shift towards 
option based executive compensation; and institutionalization of financial markets.  
 
A. Methodology  
To decompose volatility into firm-specific volatility and systematic volatility, we 



















t w firm r , ,  is firm’s weekly return in year t, 
c
t w m r , ,  is the weekly value-weighted 
local market return in year t, and 
US
t w m r , ,  is the weekly S&P 500 return in year t. All 
returns are expressed in local currency including the S&P 500 return. We drop firms 
with fewer than 10 weekly observations in a year. Local market indexes exclude the 
firm in question to avoid spurious correlation between individual returns and indexes 
for markets with few firms.  
For every firm i from country c and year t, firm-specific volatility is calculated as 
unexplained (residual) sum of squares (scaled by the number of weeks), summed over 
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The systematic volatility is the explained (by local market index and U.S. index) 
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To improve the normality of this variable, we also construct a logarithmic 
transformation of R










t ind t ind R R LR − = .  A high 
2
, ind t LR  represents greater 
systematic proportion in total stock return variation and therefore lower firm-specific 
variation.  
The summary statistics by industry, country, correlation coefficients, and mean 
comparison tests (conditional on national elections, party orientation, predation index, 
and autocracy index) appear in Tables II, III, IV, and V, respectively. According to   - 22 -
the correlation coefficients (Table IV), firms in less labor intensive, but more 
governance and expropriation sensitive industries or in lower GDP-per-capita, or 
higher predation, autocracy or politically risky countries have significantly higher 
market model R
2. The means comparison tests (Table V) reveal that R
2 is higher when 
a left party is in power, and it is not different during election years when averaged 
over the whole sample. R
2 is generally higher in more predatory and autocratic 
countries. This result is reconfirms the findings by Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) that 
R2 is larger in countries with better institutional development. 
In the next section, we repeat the volatility regressions using 
2
, ind t LR  as the 
dependent variable. A positive coefficient on any of our political sensitivity measures 
interacted with politics variable would imply that the systematic proportion in stock 
return variation increases by a disproportionally greater amount (compared to firm-
specific volatility) for politically-sensitive industries.  
 
B. Results  
Table VII reports the results of regressions with LR
2 – the log transformation of 
the ratio of systematic volatility to total volatility – as the dependent variable on four 
types of political uncertainty (election years in Panel A, party orientation in Panel B, 
autocracy in Panel C and predation in Panel D) and four types of industry sensitivity 
to political risk (labor, trade, governance and expropriation equation in each panel). 
As before, in each regression we control for unobservable year, industry, and country 
characteristics, and the reported p-values based robust standard errors. 
The election dummy variable in Panel A of Table VII is significant in three out of 
the four equations, indicating that LR
2 is higher in election years. However industries 
sensitive to trade, governance and expropriation do not necessarily have higher LR
2. 
Note, that in Panel A of Table VI (volatility regressions) the election dummy is 
insignificant, but the interaction terms are significant. It is possible that although the 
systematic portion of returns variation increases on average for the whole sample, the 
firm-specific portion decreases and overall volatility does not change. On the other 
hand, more politically sensitive industries (through trade, governance and 
expropriation) exhibit higher volatility without changing the proportions of systematic 
and firm-specific variation. 
In Panel B we document significantly higher LR
2 under a ruling party with left 
orientation (except in the labor equation) without any stronger effect for politically 
sensitive industries. The lack of the significance does not necessarily mean that the   - 23 -
systematic portion of stock return volatility is not affected by political uncertainty; 
rather it means that the increase in volatility during election years is caused by an 
increase in both volatility components – firm specific volatility and systematic 
volatility. 
Autocracy has a particularly strong effect on LR
2 in Panel C of Table VII, 
implying that the proportion of systematic risk increases for politically sensitive 
industries in an autocratic political environment. The coefficient of the labor intensity 
– autocracy interaction term is significantly positive in Panel C of Table VII and 
significantly negative in Panel C of Table VII. This contrasting result can be seen to 
imply an even greater reduction in the firm-specific part of returns variability. We 
confirm this in unreported regression results with firm-specific variation as the 
dependent variable.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks  
Does politics influence finance? This question has sparked numerous theoretical and 
empirical inquires. Existing literature does not provide a clear-cut answer to this 
question. While the ‘partisan’ theory asserts that politics should influence the 
economy, the ‘rational partisan theory’ argues otherwise. Empirical evidence is also 
scant and mixed. This paper attempts to assess the impact of political structure on 
stock market volatility using within-countries, across-industries methodology.  
We hypothesize that various industries react to political structures and political 
events differently. Moreover, we expect industries that are more sensitive to political 
structures to exhibit higher levels of volatility. Such within-country setup allows us to 
control for country, industry, and time fixed effects, thus mitigating the omitted 
variable bias and model misspecification. 
Several measures of political sensitivities are employed: labor sensitivity (labor 
intensive industries should be more affected by regulations imposed left-wing 
governments); foreign trade sensitivity (foreign trade-intensive industries are more 
likely to be affected by government regulators, who seek to protect incumbents); 
governance sensitivity (firms that use inputs from different industries are more 
dependent on contracts enforcement); and expropriation sensitivity (industries, whose 
performance is likely to be affected by luck, rather than by skill, are more prone to 
expropriation). 
We provide substantiation that there is a strong link between political structures 
and volatility. Although the initial comparison of market volatilities under left- and   - 24 -
right-wing governments did not reveal a clear-cut relationship between party 
orientation and volatility (a result that is largely consistent with prior studies), 
industry-specific analysis provided robust evidence of the impact of politics on 
volatility. More specifically, we document that labor intensive, foreign trade-
sensitive, governance-sensitive and expropriation-sensitive industries exhibit higher 
volatilities during election years. Moreover, labor-intensive firms display higher 
volatilities when left governments are in power. Predatory and autocratic governments 
have a positive effect on volatilities in industries that require good governance or 
industries with higher expropriation risk. The volatility decomposition results indicate 
that the increase in total volatility for politically-sensitive industries is mostly driven 
by an increase in systematic risk and/or a simultaneous decrease in firm-specific risk. 
We argue that our results are consistent with the ‘peso problem’ explanation of 
excess volatility – the market anticipates a very significant event (change in political 
regime, significant changes to laws, expropriation) that may or may not materialize. 
Indeed, firms that are more prone to experience such significant, even catastrophic 
events (such as expropriation) are shown to have excess volatilities when the 
probabilities of such events are higher. We believe our paper contributes to 
understanding of the sources of volatility dynamics in different industries and 
countries.   25
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Figure 1: Labor sensitivities: This graph plots industry labor sensitivities, 1990-2005 average.  Labor sensitivity is defined as the value of labor inputs over 
the total value of inputs. We use time-variant measures from 1990 through 1995. For years 1996-2005, we rely on time-invariant values for 1995. Labor 
sensitivity is computed by dividing the value of labor inputs over the total value of inputs. Data on inputs is from the input-output database developed by Dale 
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Figure 2: Foreign trade sensitivities: Foreign trade sensitivities assess the exposure of a particular industry to foreign trade. It is defined as (value of exports 
+ value of imports) / value of output for 2002. The trade data are obtained from the United States International Trade Commission and contain statistics on the 
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Figure 3: Governance sensitivities: Governance sensitivities are defined as the concentration of purchases of a certain industry,  ∑ − =
j
j i j i C
2
, , 1 φ , where 
j i, φ  is the share of input of industry j in the production of industry i. The data comes from input-output tables of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The data 
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Figure 4: Expropriation sensitivities. Industry expropriation sensitivities are defined as the coefficient on the log of inflation-adjusted oil price of an 
industry-specific regression of median industry valuation (Q) on a constant (α), a time trend (t) and the log of oil price (P) run using all firms in 
COMPUSTAT during the time period from 1950 through 2005. The regression is  ( )
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Figure 5: Number of nationalizations by industry (1955-1990 total) and industry oil 
dependency:  Nationalizations are defined as forced divestment of foreign property. Industry oil 
price-dependency is defined as the coefficient on the log of inflation-adjusted oil price of an industry-
specific regression of median industry valuation (Q) on a constant (α), a time trend (t) and the log of 
oil price (P) run using all firms in COMPUSTAT during the time period from 1950 through 2005. 





ind ind ind ind
t P t Q μ β α + + + = ln . The intercept and the slope of the line are 
determined by the following OLS regression: Number of expropriation instances =132.1 + 48.6 × 
Industry oil price-dependency (p-value = 0.00; R
2  = 0.08; Number of industries = 13).  Source: 

































































Descriptive statistics by industry, 1990-2005. 
 
This table contain summary statistics by industry (averages across industries and years, 1990-2005). SIC code is 2-digit 
Standard Industry Classification code. The variables are: labor sensitivity, foreign trade sensitivity, governance 
sensitivity, expropriation sensitivity, volatility, and R
2. N is the aggregate number of industry observations across all 
countries and years, 1990-2005.  
 
      Political sensitivities        
industry name 
SIC 
code labor trade  governance  expropriation VOL R
2 N 
Agricultural Crops  100  0.277    0.903  -0.110  0.006906  0.164  210 
Agriculture Livestock  200        -0.428  0.006573  0.189  240 
Agricultural Services  700        -0.265  0.008070  0.159  163 
Forestry 800      0.490  -1.087  0.005624  0.182  230 
Fishing And Hunting  900        -0.103  0.009179  0.185  63 
Metal Mining  1000  0.417    0.923  -0.151  0.009726  0.187  364 
Coal Mining  1200  0.427    0.903  0.057  0.011713  0.200  150 
Oil And Gas Extraction  1300  0.191    0.816  0.049  0.007832  0.212  329 
Quarrying Of Minerals  1400  0.316      0.078  0.009059  0.165  235 
Building Construction  1500  0.430    0.931  -0.024  0.006460  0.196  510 
Heavy Construction  1600        -0.245  0.005767  0.211  424 
Construction Special  1700        -0.237  0.005760  0.171  306 
Food Products  2000  0.171  0.256  0.865 0.007  0.004813 0.184  702 
Tobacco Products  2100  0.141  0.169    0.210  0.003424  0.195  245 
Textile Mill Products  2200  0.252  0.376  0.822  -0.207  0.007572  0.167  490 
Apparel 2300  0.339  0.910  0.823  -0.174  0.005943  0.179  426 
Lumber And Wood 
Products 2400  0.223  0.241  0.807 -0.414  0.005921 0.177  364 
Furniture And Fixtures  2500  0.344  0.652  0.924  -0.308  0.006481  0.162  303 
Paper And Allied 
Products 2600  0.253  0.478  0.852 -0.133  0.005299 0.188  573 
Printing And Publishing  2700  0.435  0.585  0.894  -0.352  0.006125  0.171  458 
Chemicals And Allied 
Products 2800  0.260  0.420  0.828 -0.354  0.005863 0.201  636 
Petroleum Refining  2900  0.084  0.083  0.494  -0.516  0.004711  0.282  380 
Rubber And Plastics 
Products 3000  0.321  0.544  0.828 -0.100  0.005693 0.203  492 
Leather And Leather 
Products 3100  0.244  0.968    -0.099 0.005972 0.203  199 
Stone, Clay, And Glass  3200  0.388  0.595  0.911  -0.058  0.005338  0.227  618 
Primary Metal 
Industries 3300  0.243  0.545  0.785 -0.071  0.006354 0.221  630 
Fabricated Metal 
Products 3400  0.311  0.578  0.852 -0.033  0.006440 0.172  470 
Industrial And 
Computer Equipment  3500  0.356  0.702  0.894  -0.101  0.006589  0.185  548 
Electronic And 
Electrical Equipment  3600  0.293  0.826  0.910  -0.121  0.007353  0.200  549 
Transportation 
Equipment 3700  0.327  0.474  0.813  -0.071  0.005232  0.198  536 
Measuring Instruments  3800  0.494  0.886    -0.301  0.007233  0.191  349 
Miscellaneous 
Industries 3900  0.290  0.689  0.937 -0.332  0.006829 0.183  353 
Railroad Transportation  4000  0.390    0.912  0.060  0.004044  0.188  118 
Highway Passenger 
Transportation 4100      0.936  0.117  0.006053  0.165  217   34
Table I continued 
 
      Political sensitivities        
industry name 
SIC 
code labor trade  governance  expropriation VOL R
2 N 
Motor Freight 
Transportation 4200      0.911  -0.021  0.005597  0.197  302 
Water Transportation  4400      0.834  -0.034  0.004630  0.199  488 
Transportation By Air  4500      0.845  -0.285  0.005287  0.237  421 
Pipelines, Except 
Natural Gas  4600      0.902  -0.137  0.006214  0.172  29 
Transportation Services  4700      0.928  -0.508  0.005904  0.187  414 
Communications 4800  0.264    0.789 0.090  0.005865  0.248  597 
Electric, Gas, And 
Sanitary Services  4900  0.181    0.778  -0.009  0.004663  0.210  583 
Wholesale Trade-
durable Goods  5000  0.467    0.941  -0.157  0.006656  0.185  567 
Wholesale Trade-non-
durable Goods  5100        -0.057  0.005807  0.204  618 
Building Materials  5200    0.922 0.036 0.004767  0.187  134
General Merchandise 
Stores 5300        -0.469  0.004234  0.222  347 
Food Stores  5400    -0.409 0.004363  0.221  450
Automotive Dealers  5500        -0.054  0.005142  0.162  255 
Apparel And Accessory 
Stores 5600    -0.074 0.005818  0.160  324
Home Furniture Stores  5700        0.034  0.006614  0.178  302 
Eating And Drinking 
Places 5800    0.848 -0.383 0.005751  0.200  302
Miscellaneous Retail  5900        -0.411  0.006383  0.178  386 
Depository Institutions  6000  0.250    0.894  -0.157  0.003994  0.266  724 
Non-depository Credit 
Institutions 6100        -0.143  0.008817  0.209  316 
Security And 
Commodity Brokers  6200      0.828  0.569  0.006975  0.232  499 
Insurance Carriers  6300        -0.199  0.003551  0.260  519 
Insurance Agents 
Service 6400        -0.165  0.005857  0.163  170 
Real Estate  6500      0.912  -0.268  0.006111  0.182  548 
Investment Offices  6700      0.266  0.205  0.006289  0.203  546 
Hotels   7000  0.445    0.945  0.152  0.005879  0.207  489 
Personal  Services 7200       -0.152  0.004790  0.126  113 
Business Services  7300    0.292  0.913  -0.174  0.007876  0.195  553 
Automotive Repair  7500    0.014    -0.107  0.005596  0.188  172 
Miscellaneous Repair 
Services 7600    0.900    0.202  0.004992  0.159  57 
Motion Pictures  7800    0.127  0.735  -0.161  0.008063  0.151  208 
Amusement Services  7900      0.924  -0.220  0.006914  0.145  356 
Health Services  8000      0.938  0.262  0.006349  0.158  298 
Legal Services  8100      0.896  -0.109  0.008274  0.063  9 
Educational Services  8200      0.891  -0.443  0.009082  0.162  186 
Social Services  8300      0.940  0.425  0.010031  0.097  72 
Museums And Art 
Galleries 8400      0.833  -0.201  0.004971  0.095  25 
Engineering And 
Accounting 8700      0.858  -0.436  0.006989  0.189  442 
Nonclassifiable 
Establishments  9900           -0.212  0.006853  0.145  78 
Average     0.307  0.513  0.847  -0.139  0.006  0.186    
Total                       25,779   35
Table II 
Election Cycles, 1990-2004 
 
This table lists the types of political systems (presidential or parliamentary), the government chief executive’s party orientation during the sample period (left, right, or center), years and dates of 
the elections of government chief executives. Data source: World Bank's Database of Political Institutions supplemented with information from the Journal of Democracy, Elections around the 
World (http://www.electionworld.org/), Election Guide (http://www.electionguide.org/), and the CIA Factbook. “NA” appears for cases in which the exact party orientation cannot be determined.  
 
Country System  Party  type  Year 
Elections 
dates Country System  Party  type  Year 
Elections 
dates Country  System Party  type  Year 
Elections 
dates 
Argentina  Presidential  1990-1995: R  -  -  Indonesia  Parliamentary  1990-1992: NA  -  -  Portugal  Parliamentary  1990-1991: R  -  - 
      1996-1999: R  1995  14-May-95        1993-1996: NA  1992  9-Jun-92        1992-1995: R  1991  6-Oct-91 
      2000-2001: C  1999  24-Oct-99        1998-1999: NA  1997  30-May-97        1996-1999: L  1995  1-Oct-95 
      2002-2003: R  -  -        2000-2004: NA  1999  NA        2000-2002: L  1999  10-Oct-99 
      2004: R  2003  27-Apr-03        -  2004  20-Sep-04        2003-2004: R  2002  17-Mar-02 
Australia  Parliamentary  1990-1992: L  1990  24-Mar-90  Ireland  Parliamentary  1990-1992: C  -  -  Russia  Parliamentary  1990-1991: L  -  - 
      1993-1996: L  1993  13-Mar-93        1993-1994: C  1992  25-Nov-92        1992-1996: NA  1991  12-Jun-91 
      1997-1998: R  1996  2-Mar-96        1995-1997: R  -  -        1997-2000: NA  1996  16-Jun-96 
      1999-2001: R  1998  3-Oct-98        1998-2002: C  1997  6-Jun-97        2001-2004: NA  2000  26-Mar-00 
      2002-2004: R  2001  10-Nov-01        2003-2004: C  2002  18-May-02        -  2004  14-Mar-04 
      2005-2006: L  2004  9-Oct-04  Israel  Parliamentary  1990-1992: R  -  -  Singapore  Parliamentary  1990-1991: NA  -  - 
Austria  Parliamentary  1990-1994: L  1990  7-Oct-90        1993-1996: L  1992  19-Jun-92        1992-1997: NA  1991  31-Aug-91 
      1995-1995: L  1994  9-Oct-94        1997-1999: R  1996  31-May-96        1998-2001: NA  1997  2-Jun-97 
      1996-1999: L  1995  17-Dec-95        2000-2001: R  1999  31-May-99        2002-2004: NA  2001  23-Sep-01 
      2000-2002: R  1999  3-Oct-99        2002-2004: R  2001  6-Feb-01  South Africa  Parliamentary  1990-1994: R  -  - 
      2003-2004: R  2002  24-Nov-02  Italy  Parliamentary  1990-1992: C  -  23-Jun-92        1995-1999: L  1994  26-Apr-94 
Belgium  Parliamentary  1990-1995: R  1991  24-Nov-91        1993-1994: L  1992  5-Apr-92        2000-2004: L  1999  2-Jun-99 
      1996-1999: R  1995  21-May-95        1995-1996: R  1994  26-Mar-94        -  2004  14-Apr-04 
      2000-2003: R  1999  13-May-99        1997-2001: C  1996  21-Apr-96  South Korea  Presidential  1990-1992: R  -  - 
      2004: R  2003  18-May-03        2002-2004: R  2001  15-May-01        1993-1995: R  1992  24-Mar-92 
Brazil  Presidential  1990-1994: R  1989  -  Japan  Parliamentary  1990: R  1986  7-Jul-86        1996-2000: C  1996  11-Apr-96 
      1995-1998: L  1994  3-Oct-94        1991-1993: R  1990  18-Feb-90        2001-2004: C  2000  13-Apr-00 
      1999-2002: L  1998  4-Oct-98        1994: R  1993  18-Jul-93        -  2004  15-Apr-04 
      2003-2004: L  2002  6-Oct-02        1995-1996: L  -  -  Spain  Parliamentary  1990-1993: L  -  - 
Canada  Parliamentary  1990-1993: R  1988  21-Nov-88        1997-2000: R  1996  20-Oct-96        1994-1996: L  1993  6-Jun-93 
      1994-1997: L  1993  25-Oct-93        2001-2003: R  2000  25-Jun-00        1997-2000: R  1996  3-Mar-96 
      1998-2000: L  1997  13-Apr-90        2004: R  2003  9-Nov-03        2001-2004: R  2000  12-Mar-00 
      2001-2004: L  2000  27-Nov-00  Luxembg.  Parliamentary  1990-1994: C  -  -        -  2004  14-Mar-04 
      2005: L  2004  28-Jun-04        1995-1999: C  1994  12-Jun-94  Sri Lanka  Presidential  1990-1994: C  -  - 
Chile  Presidential  1990-1993: R  1989  -        2000-2004: C  1999  13-Jun-99        1995-1999: L  1994  9-Nov-94 
      1994-1999: R  1993  11-Dec-93           2004  13-Jun-04        2000-2004: L  1999  21-Dec-99 
      2000-2004: R  2000  16-Jan-00  Malaysia  Parliamentary  1990: NA  -  -  Sweden  Parliamentary  1990-1991: L  -  -   36
Table II continued 
 
Country System  Party  type  Year 
Election 
dates Country  System  Party  type  Year 
Election 
dates Country  System  Party  type  Year 
Election 
dates 
China  NA  1990-2004: L  -  -        1991-1995: NA  1990  21-Oct-90        1992-1994: R  1991  15-Sep-91 
Colombia  Presidential  1990-1994: C  1990  27-May-90        1996-1999: NA  1995  24-May-95        1995-1998: L  1994  18-Sep-94 
      1995-1998: C  1994  29-May-94        2000-2003: NA  1999  29-Nov-99        1999-2002: L  1998  20-Sep-98 
      1999-2002: R  1998  31-May-98           2004  21-Mar-04        2003-2004: L  2002  17-Sep-02 
      2003-2004: NA  2002  26-May-02  Mexico  Presidential  1990-1994: L  -  -  Switzerland  Parliamentary  1991-1991: NA  -  - 
Czech Rep.  Parliamentary  1990: L  -  24-Apr-90        1995-2000: L  1994  21-Aug-94        1992-1995: NA  1991  20-Oct-91 
      1991-1992: NA  -  -        2001-2004: R  2000  2-Jul-00        1996-1999: NA  1995  22-Oct-95 
      1993-1996: R  1992  6-Jun-92  Morocco  Presidential  1990-1993: NA  -  -        2000-2003: NA  1999  24-Oct-99 
      1997-1998: R  1996  31-May-96        1994-1997: NA  1993  25-Jun-93        2004: R  2003  19-Oct-03 
      1999-2001: L  1998  13-Nov-98        1998-2002: NA  1997  14-Nov-97  Taiwan  Parliamentary  1990-1992: R  -  - 
      2002-2004: L  2002  14-Jun-02        2003-2004: NA  2002  27-Sep-02        1993-1996: R  1992  9-Dec-92 
Denmark  Parliamentary  1990-1993: R  1990  12-Dec-90  Netherlands  Parliamentary  1990-1991: R  -  -        1997-2000: R  1996  23-Mar-96 
      1994-1997: L  1994  21-Sep-94        1992-1994: R  1991  NA        2001-2004: R  2000  18-Mar-00 
      1998-2001: L  1998  11-Mar-98        1995-1998: L  1994  3-May-94        -  2004  20-Mar-04 
      2001-2004: R  2001  20-Nov-01        1999-2002: L  1998  6-May-98  Thailand  Parliamentary  1990-1991: R  -  - 
Egypt  Parliamentary  1990-1995: NA  1990  29-Nov-90        2003: L  2002  15-May-02        1992: NA  -  - 
      1995-2000: NA  1995  29-Nov-95        2004: R  2003  22-Jan-03        1993-1995: R  1992  13-Sep-92 
      2001-2007: NA  2000  18-Oct-00  New Zealand  Parliamentary  1990: L  -  -        1996: R  1995  2-Jul-95 
Finland  Parliamentary  1990: R  -  -        1990-1993: R  1990  27-Oct-90        1997-2000: R  1996  17-Nov-96 
      1991-1995: C  1991  17-Mar-91        1994-1996: R  1993  6-Nov-93        2001-2004: NA  2001  6-Jan-01 
      1996-1999: L  1995  19-Mar-95        1997-1999: R  1996  12-Oct-96  Turkey  Parliamentary  1990-1991: R  -  - 
      2000-2002: L  1999  21-Mar-99        2000-2002: L  1999  27-Nov-99        1992-1995: R  1991  20-Oct-91 
      2003-2004: C  2003  16-Mar-03        2003-2004: L  2002  27-Jul-02        1996-1999: R  1995  24-Dec-95 
France  Parliamentary  1990-1993: L  1988  9-May-88  Norway  Parliamentary  1990: R  -  -        2000-2002: L  1999  18-Apr-99 
      1994-1997: R  1993  21-Mar-93        1991-1993: L  -  -        2003-2004: NA  2002  3-Nov-02 
      1998-2002: L  1997  25-May-97        1994-1997: L  1993  13-Sep-93  UK  Parliamentary  1990-1992: R  1987  12-Jun-87 
      2003-2004: R  2002  16-Jun-02        1998-2001: R  1997  16-Sep-97        1993-1997: R  1992  9-Apr-92 
Germany  Parliamentary  1990-1993: R  1990  3-Dec-90        2002-2004: R  2001  10-Sep-01        1998-2001: L  1997  1-May-97 
      1994-1998: R  1994  16-Oct-94  Pakistan  Parliamentary  1990: L  -  -        2002-2004: L  2001  7-Jun-01 
      1999-2002: L  1998  27-Sep-98        1991-1993: R  1990  24-Oct-90  US  Presidential  1990-1992: R  1988  9-Nov-88 
      2003-2004: L  2002  22-Sep-02        1994-1997: L  1993  6-Oct-93        1993-1996: L  1992  3-Nov-92 
Greece  Parliamentary  1990: L  -  -        1998-2002: NA  1997  3-Feb-97        1997-2000: L  1996  5-Nov-96 
      1991-1993: R  1990  8-Apr-90        2003-2004: NA  2002  10-Oct-02        2001-2004: R  2000  7-Sep-00 
      1994-1996: L  1993  10-Oct-93  Peru  Presidential  1990: L  -  -        -  2004  2-Sep-04 
      1997-2000: L  1996  22-Sep-96        1991-1995: R  1990  10-Jun-90  Venezuela  Presidential  1990-1993: R  -  - 
      2001-2004: L  2000  9-Apr-00        1996-2000: R  1995  9-Apr-95        1994-1998: NA  1993  5-Dec-93 
      -  2004  7-Mar-04        2001: R  2000  9-Apr-00        1999-2000: NA  1998  6-Dec-98 
Hong Kong  NA  NA  NA  NA        2002-2004: C  2001  8-Apr-01        2001-2004: NA  2000  30-Jul-00 
               Philippines  NA  1990-1992: NA  -  -  Zimbabwe  Parliamentary  1990-1996: NA  1990  27-Mar-90   37
Table II continued 
 
Country System  Party  type  Year 
Election 
dates Country  System  Party  type  Year 
Election 
dates Country  System  Party  type  Year 
Election 
dates 
Hungary  Parliamentary  1990: L  -  -        1993-1998: C  1992  11-May-92        1997-2000: NA  1996  15-Mar-96 
      1991-1994: R  1990  25-Mar-90        1999-2000: NA  1998  11-May-98        2001-2002: NA  2000  - 
      1995-1998: L  1994  8-May-94        2001-2004: C  -  -        2003-2004: NA  2002  9-Mar-02 
      1999-2002: L  1998  10-May-98        -  2004  10-May-04                
      2003-2004: L  2002  4-Apr-02  Poland  Presidential  1990: L  -  -                
India  Parliamentary  1990-1991: L  -  -        1991-1995: NA  1990  9-Dec-90                
      1992-1996: L  1991  1-May-91        1996-2000: L  1995  5-Nov-95                
      1997-1998: L  1996  21-Apr-96        2001-2005: L  2000  8-Oct-00                
      1999: R  1998  16-Feb-98                               
      2000-2003: R  1999  5-Sep-99                               





Descriptive statistics by country, 1990-2005. 
 
This table contain summary statistics country (averages across industries and years, 1990-2005). The 
variables are: GDP per capita, volatility, R
2, predation index, and autocracy index. N is the aggregate 




capita VOL  R
2 Predation  Autocracy  N 
Argentina $11,268  0.006436  0.303 1.910  2.616 333 
Australia $24,471  0.009791  0.100  0.283 0.000  950 
Austria $26,332  0.003517  0.170  0.628  0.000  379 
Belgium $25,357  0.002659  0.159  0.969 0.000  498 
Brazil $6,927  0.011180  0.187  2.714  2.000  634 
Canada $25,968  0.008021  0.093  0.404  0.000  999 
Chile $8,220  0.004070  0.181  0.797  1.720  467 
China $3,831  0.004351  0.463  3.041  17.000  668 
Columbia $6,281  0.004551  0.262 2.660 2.521  145 
Czech Rep.  $13,658  0.005507  0.154  1.563  0.000  127 
Denmark $25,857  0.003072 0.123 0.495 0.000  533
Egypt $3,493  0.003918  0.299  2.383  15.186  91 
Finland $23,859  0.004166 0.154 0.449 0.000  478
France $24,528  0.004354  0.116  0.855  1.000  984 
Germany $23,944  0.004693  0.129 0.710 0.000  867 
Greece $16,296  0.006337  0.273  1.714  0.000  657 
Hong Kong  $23,850  0.007283  0.188  0.300     857 
Hungary $12,076  0.006039  0.200  1.370 0.000  178 
India $2,234  0.007529  0.225  2.676  1.321  635 
Indonesia $2,748  0.012980  0.217  3.256 10.854  643 
Ireland $25,375  0.006307  0.153  0.701  1.807  287 
Israel $18,806  0.004228  0.301  1.387  0.447  414 
Italy $23,802  0.002786  0.218  1.794  0.000  603 
Japan $24,286  0.004204  0.195  0.679  0.000  1,031 
Luxembourg $46,042  0.003098 0.139 0.000  117
Malaysia $7,785  0.005248  0.331  1.672 6.661  900 
Mexico $8,111  0.004786 0.205 2.779 4.736  374
Morocco $3,791  0.001571  0.268    16.316  98 
Netherlands $25,648 0.002871  0.139  0.477  0.000  570 
New Zealand  $19,669  0.005795  0.110  0.191  0.000  587 
Norway $31,475  0.005041  0.163  0.505  0.000  443 
Pakistan $1,821  0.006078  0.229  3.109  8.164  309 
Peru $4,588  0.007115  0.128  2.630  6.946  184 
Philippines $3,678  0.011651 0.193  2.537  2.000  444 
Poland $10,115  0.004820  0.215  1.677  0.783  316 
Portugal $16,129  0.004438  0.161  1.106 0.000  368 
Russia $8,110  0.009540 0.294 3.441 4.382  125
Singapore $24,432  0.006263  0.235 0.282  12.000 784 
South Africa  $9,540  0.009443 0.136 2.250 1.549  751
South Korea  $15,005  0.007875  0.220  1.107  3.057  838 
Spain $19,558  0.002694  0.175  1.243  0.000  559 
Sri Lanka  $2,554  0.006406  0.322  2.577  4.756  206 
Sweden $25,153  0.005109  0.171  0.292  0.000  628 
Switzerland $29,194 0.002994  0.143  0.375  0.000  554   39




capita VOL  R
2 Predation  Autocracy  N 
Taiwan $20,284  0.004770  0.326  0.982  2.572  700 
Thailand $6,052  0.007703  0.243  1.570  1.938  788 
Turkey $5,853  0.010305  0.227  2.261  2.425  560 
UK $23,484  0.004827 0.130 0.151 0.000  1,036
Venezuela $5,696  0.008139  0.283 3.104  2.547 137 
Zimbabwe $1,974  0.017277 0.197 4.000 16.103 147
Average  $15,584 0.006077  0.205  1.543  3.131  520 
Total        25,981  40
Table IV 
Correlation coefficients between main variables. 
 
This table reports the correlation coefficients between the main variables. The numbers in parentheses are probability levels at which 
the hypothesis of zero correlation can be rejected. LVOL is the log of volatility. LR
2 is the logarithmic transformation of R
2, where R
2 
is the ratio of systematic returns variation to total returns variation (the sum of firm-specific variation and systematic variation). The 
coefficients significant at the 10% level (based on a two-tailed test) or higher are in boldface.  
 














log transformation of R
2  0.023       
   (0.00)                      
labor sensitivity  0.120 -0.052                  
   (0.00) (0.00)    
foreign trade sensitivity  0.032  -0.014  0.118                
   (0.00)  (0.11)  (0.00)                
governance sensitivity  -0.044 0.049 -0.709 -0.214   
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)             
expropriation sensitivity  0.031 0.012  0.042  0.043  -0.026          
   (0.00)  (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
GDP per capita  -0.219 -0.291  0.041 0.030  0.003  -0.0048       
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.64)  (0.44)       
predation  0.215 0.246  -0.063  -0.036  0.011  0.0103 -0.7767    
   (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.14)  (0.10) (0.00)     
autocracy  0.101 0.298  -0.011  -0.035 -0.013  -0.0142  -0.4712  0.4429 
   (0.00) (0.00)  (0.24)  (0.00) (0.10) (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.00)   41
Table V 
Mean comparison tests of volatility and R2 measures conditional on party 
orientation, elections, autocracy, and predation.  
 
This table reports the t-statistics of means comparison tests of volatility and R
2 across different groups. 
The groups are: left party vs. right party (Panel A); elections vs. no elections (Panel B); high-autocracy 
vs. low-autocracy (Panel C); and high-predation vs. low predation (Panel D). The numbers in 
parentheses are probability levels at which the hypothesis of equal means can be rejected. The 
coefficients significant at the 10% level (based on a two-tailed test) or higher are in boldface. N is the 
number of observations in each group. 
 
Panel A: Split by party orientation 
 
Left (right) group contain observations that belong to countries and years with parties classified as left 
(right).  
 
Party N  VOL  R
2 
Left party  8,464  0.00613  0.193 
Right party 9,169  0.00560  0.187 
Left party – Right party   0.000533  0.00607   
t-statistic  5.5624  2.6147 
p-value   (0.00) (0.00) 
 
Panel B: Split by elections 
 
Election (no-election) group contain observations that belong to years of national elections.  
 
Elections N  VOL  R
2 
Election 5,417      0.00614       0.203 
No election 17,843    0.00622    0.200   
Election – No election   -0.00008 0.00245 
t-statistic   -0.716    1.016   
p-value   (0.24)  (0.16)     
 
Panel C: Split by autocracy index 
 
High-autocracy (low-autocracy) group contain observations that belong to the top 75
th percentile, 
autocracy > 2, (bottom 25
th percentile, autocracy = 0) of the autocracy index.  
 
Autocracy N  VOL  R
2 
High autocracy 8,104 0.00661 0.257 
Low autocracy 12,295  0.00497    0.158 
High – Low    0.00164     0.0997   
t-statistic    18.957  46.744    
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Table V continued 
 
Panel D: Split by predation index 
 
High-predation (low-predation) group contain observations that belong to the top 75
th 
percentile, predation > 2.08, (bottom 25
th percentile, predation < 0.499) of the predation 
index.  
 
Predation N  VOL  R
2 
High predation  6,785  0.00830  0.244 
Low predation  6,319  0.00640  0.146 
High – Low 0.00190 -0.0986 
t-stat   14.081  38.586     










































Regressions of log of volatility on interaction terms including country, industry, and 
year fixed effects, and with robust standard errors. 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of log of volatility used as a dependent variable. The political 
sensitivities (labor, foreign trade, governance, and expropriation) are interacted with nation elections (Panel A), 
party orientation dummy (Panel B), autocracy index (Panel C), or predation index (Panel D). All regressions 
include industry, country, and year fixed effects. Numbers in parentheses are probability levels at which the 
hypothesis of no relationship can be rejected. The computed p-values are based on robust (heteroscedasticity-
consistent) standard errors. The coefficients significant at the 10% level (based on a two-tailed test) or higher 
are in bold face. Industries from the U.S. are dropped from the sample.  
 
Panel A: Elections 
 
dependent variable  LVOL 
country variable  ELECTIONS 
industry sensitivity  labor   foreign trade    governance  expropriation  
labor sensitivity × elections  0.163504          
   (0.02)          
foreign trade sensitivity × elections     0.022173       
      (0.05)       
governance sensitivity × elections        0.036178    
         (0.07)    
expropriation sensitivity × elections          
0.005784 
(0.09) 
elections  0.038641 0.022522  0.003647  0.010326 
   (0.42) (0.23)  (0.86)  (0.44) 
regression R
2 0.402  0.369  0.371  0.353 
number of observations 12,791 12,229 17,588  23,100
 
Panel B: Party orientation 
 
dependent variable  LVOL 
country variable  LEFT PARTY 
industry sensitivity  labor   foreign trade    governance  expropriation  
labor sensitivity × left party  0.233012          
   (0.10)          
foreign trade sensitivity × left party -0.005493
      (0.73)       
governance sensitivity × left party        -0.294490    
(0.00) 
expropriation sensitivity × left party          
0.172164 
(0.16) 
left party -0.028423 0.051234 0.084069 0.063594
   (0.54) (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
regression R
2 0.401  0.365  0.370  0.351 















Panel C: Autocracy 
 
dependent variable  LVOL 
country variable  AUTOCRACY 
industry sensitivity  labor   foreign trade    governance  expropriation  
labor sensitivity × autocracy  -0.078430          
   (0.00)          
foreign trade sensitivity × autocracy     0.001512       
      (0.54)       
governance sensitivity × autocracy        0.012786    
         (0.03)    
expropriation sensitivity × autocracy          
0.065910 
(0.01) 
autocracy  0.027017  -0.002241 -0.001369  -0.001061 
   (0.00) (0.62)  (0.75)  (0.76) 
regression R
2 0.422  0.389  0.391  0.371 
number of observations  12,527  11,973  17,258  22,658 
 
Panel D: Predation 
 
dependent variable  LVOL 
country variable  PREDATION 
industry sensitivity  labor   foreign trade    governance  expropriation  
labor sensitivity × predation  -0.475641          
   (0.00)          
foreign trade sensitivity × predation     0.001240       
(0.87)
governance sensitivity × predation        0.140921    
         (0.00)    
expropriation sensitivity × predation          
0.199711  
(0.03) 
predation  0.299078 0.129768  0.141431  0.173621 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
regression R
2 0.394 0.362 0.359 0.344














Regressions of log transformation of R
2 on interaction terms including country, 
industry, and year fixed effects, and with robust standard errors. 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of log transformation of R
2. The political sensitivities (labor, 
foreign trade, governance, and expropriation) are interacted with nation elections (Panel A), party orientation 
dummy (Panel B), autocracy index (Panel C), or predation index (Panel D). All regressions include industry, 
country, and year fixed effects. Numbers in parentheses are probability levels at which the hypothesis of no 
relationship can be rejected. The computed p-values are based on robust (heteroscedasticity-consistent) standard 
errors. The coefficients significant at the 10% level (based on a two-tailed test) or higher are in bold face. 
Industries from the U.S. are dropped from the sample.  
 
Panel A: Elections 
 
dependent variable  LOG R
2 
country variable  ELECTIONS 
industry sensitivity  labor   foreign trade    governance  expropriation  
labor sensitivity × elections  0.113642          
   (0.09)          
foreign trade sensitivity × elections     -0.012294       
      (0.56)       
governance sensitivity × elections        -0.142362    
         (0.31)    
expropriation sensitivity ×elections          
-0.073809 
(0.32) 
elections  0.065733  0.116686 0.122205  0.095407 
   (0.33) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
regression R
2 0.320  0.304  0.324  0.318 
number of observations  12,791  12,229  17,588  23,100 
 
Panel B: Party orientation 
 
dependent variable  LOG R
2 
country variable  LEFT PARTY 
industry sensitivity  labor   foreign trade   governance  expropriation  
labor sensitivity × left party  0.137536          
   (0.45)          
foreign trade sensitivity × left party     -0.026821       
      (0.17)       
governance sensitivity × left party        -0.087278    
         (0.47)    
expropriation sensitivity × left party          
-0.032101 
(0.62) 
left party  0.079640  0.147662 0.127884  0.117161 
   (0.20) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
regression R
2 0.3212  0.305  0.325  0.321 













Panel C: Autocracy 
 
dependent variable  LOG R
2 
country variable  AUTOCRACY 
industry sensitivity  labor   foreign trade   governance  expropriation  
labor sensitivity × autocracy 0.071573       
   (0.00)          
foreign trade sensitivity × autocracy     0.010513       
(0.00)
governance sensitivity × autocracy       0.058520    
        (0.00)    
expropriation sensitivity × autocracy     0.015194 
           (0.03) 
autocracy  -0.015346 0.005588  0.036618 0.026200 
(0.41) (0.71) (0.00) (0.00)
regression R
2 0.320 0.282 0.322 0.316
number of observations  12,527  11,973  17,258  22,658 
 
Panel D: Predation 
 
dependent variable  LOG R
2 
country variable  PREDATION 
industry sensitivity  labor   foreign trade    governance  expropriation  
labor sensitivity × predation  -0.036713          
   (0.68)          
foreign trade sensitivity × predation     0.007255       
      (0.47)       
governance sensitivity × predation        0.054288    
         (0.06)    
expropriation sensitivity ×predation           0.019670 
            (0.05) 
predation  0.044470  0.075023 0.115812  0.038859 
   (0.35) (0.08)  (0.10)  (0.02) 
regression R
2 0.317  0.297  0.319  0.311 
number of observations  13,933  13,442  19,294  25,417 
 
 
 